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HAN JOO

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Great Victory
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Agricultural
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KIM HAN JOO

GREAT VICTORY
in
Agricultural
Co-operativization
in
D. P. R. K.

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Foreword

The historical cause of agricultural co-operativization was victoriously carried out in our country in only four or five years after the task of the socialist transformation of agriculture had been set forth at the 6th Plenum of the C.C. of the Workers' Party of Korea convened immediately after the truce.

Having completely healed the severe war wounds in a short space of time by relying on the advantageous co-operative economy, our agriculture is now making rapid advance.

The question of food which was most difficult in the early days following the truce and the problem of poor peasants, the most urgent ones at that time, have been completely solved, doing away with the source of exploitation and poverty once and for all in the countryside.

The agricultural policy of our Party in the post-liberation days is a striking demonstration of the correctness of Marxism-Leninism which teaches us that the land reform, a task of bourgeois democratic revolution, is no more than the first step for solving the question of peasants, though it is of great historic significance, and that revolution in the countryside must be pushed up to a higher stage so as to carry out the agricultural co-operativization, a task of socialist revolution, for the final solution of the question.

Lenin said: "Such great changes in the life of tens of millions of people, affecting the deep foundation of life and custom, as the changing from small-scale, individual peasant economy to the joint cultivation of land, can be brought

about only through long-drawn efforts and in general they take place only when the people are forced by necessity to rebuild their life." (Collected Works of Lenin, Russian Ed., Vol. 28, p. 318)

In our country, too, preparations for agricultural co-operativization had been fully made in line with the correct agricultural policy of the Party after liberation, and the movement for its realization started at a time when desire of the peasants for it became more urgent.

So it made unprecedentedly rapid progress, and was completed in a short space of time without a hitch.

The great achievement attained in the socialist transformation of agriculture means the victory of the agricultural policy our Party has consistently pursued since liberation.



1. PREPARATORY STAGE OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVIZATION

Until liberation, Korea remained a backward colonial, semi-feudal agricultural country.

Japanese imperialists and a small number of landlords, only some 100,000 households, or 3-4 per cent of the total peasant households, owned 2,600,000 jungbo of land, or 60 per cent of the total arable land. While most of the peasants, 2,400,000 peasant households with little or no land, or 80 per cent of the total peasant households, were tenant farmers under the condition of semi-serfdom. Farm rent usually exceeded 50 per cent of the harvest, and sometimes it reached 70-80 per cent. More than 70 per cent of the peasant households ran out of food for three or four months every year, while less than 20 per cent of the peasant households had sufficient food.

The capitalist sector in agriculture found its expression somewhat only in some fruit growing, livestock breeding and ginseng cultivation. The rich peasant economy also was insignificant and most of the rich peasants assumed the character of semi-landlords.

The merciless exploitation by the Japanese imperialists and feudal landlords inevitably brought about a general standstill of the agricultural productive forces and the impoverishment of toiling peasants.

The deep-rooted contradiction in the countryside constituted one of the major causes which led the Korean people to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal national liberation struggle. The land and peasant question was a most important question in our revolution.

Consequently, it was taken up as a most important revolutionary task in the Ten-point Programme of the Fatherland Restoration Association which was organized and led by Comrade Kim Il Sung and other staunch Communists. Greatly inspired by this programme the broad peasant masses in Korea, together with the progressive working class, rose up more valiantly in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal national liberation struggle.

However, until the country was liberated by the great Soviet Army, the merciless colonial plunder and feudal exploitation had continued in the countryside and the peasants had not been able to secure land and freedom.

Following the historic August 15 Liberation, the Korean people were provided with conditions enabling them to found a democratic independent country in accordance with their will.

After liberation, under the guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea, the tasks of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution were successfully carried out in North Korea where favourable conditions were provided by the presence of the Soviet Army and the country's economy was put on a new footing.

The Land Reform carried out in March 1946 was of great importance for promoting the country's revolution. Land owned by the Japanese, Japanese organizations, pro-Japanese, national traitors and the Korean landowners in excess of 5 jungbo, and all the land not tilled by the owners were confiscated without compensation. The confiscated land was distributed without compensation to the hired farm hands and the peasants who owned little or no land. The number of work-hands and family members determined the sizes of plots in distribution. About one million jungbo or 53.8 per cent of the total arable land was confiscated, of which over 980,000 jungbo was distributed to 720,000 toiling peasant households.

Although the land was not nationalized, it must be pointed out that the land reform was most drastic in the method of confiscation and distribution.

Owing to the land reform, not only about 30,000 landlords were liquidated as a class but the landlord-like rich peasants were hit hard. The proportion of rich peasants which had accounted for about 5 per cent of the entire peasant households was decreased to 2-3 per cent. The colonial, feudal landownership was thoroughly liquidated and the land was given to the toiling peasants in conformity with the principle, "tillers shall own land."

At the time when the land reform was carried out, the land owned by the state—the land owned by the People's Committees—was only 18,000 jungbo or less than one per cent of the total arable land.

It was eloquent proof, first of all, that the Party and the people's power took into consideration above everything else the toiling peasants' urgent desire for, and interest in, the land reform. It also showed that there existed no large scale capitalist economy in our agriculture which could be turned into state farms. Only about 2,700 jungbo of orchards confiscated from landlords was all that constituted the major material foundation of state-owned socialist agriculture in our country.

Since there was no large-scale Junker economy in Korea in the pre-liberation days, let alone modern capitalist agriculture, very few farm implements and draught animals were confiscated. Only the irrigation facilities confiscated from the Japanese imperialists and landlords were all which came into the ownership of the State and came into the use of the peasants.

In short, some confiscated orchards and irrigation facilities constituted the material foundation for the socialist sector in the field of agriculture immediately after the land reform.

Accordingly, nothing like a co-operative economy could be expected at the time. This is quite understandable.

Small commodity economy, based on the land ownership of the toiling peasants, was dominant in our agriculture. It can be seen more clearly in the following table:

(In percentages)

	1946		1949	
	Sown area	Output value	Sown area	Output value
Socialist economic form	—	—	1.7	3.2
Of which:				
State-owned	—	—	1.7	3.2
Co-operative	—	—	—	—
Small commodity economic form	96.8	94.4	95.1	91.4
Private capitalist economic form	3.2	5.6	3.2	5.4
Total	100	100	100	100

Following the land reform, nationalization of major industries was put into effect in August 1946 in the northern part of the country. As a result, industry, transport, communications, banks, etc. formerly owned by Japanese imperialists and comprador capitalists were, unlike in the field of agriculture, put under the state ownership, that is, the ownership of the entire people. Consequently, the ratio of the socialist economic sector became predominant in these fields, doing away with the relations of capitalist exploitation.

In industry, the private capitalist elements held an insignificant position and the co-operative economic sector came into being and began to grow.

Industrial Output According to Different Economic Forms

(In percentages)

	1946	1949
State-owned and co-operative industries	72.4	90.7
Of which:		
State-owned	72.4	85.5
Co-operative	—	5.2

Individual industries	27.6	9.3
Of which:		
Handicraft	4.4	1.5
Total	100	100

Thus, the people's democratic system established through the democratic reforms after liberation was put on two different economic foundations: the socialist economic sector in industry and the small commodity economic sector in agriculture.

Lenin said that the socialist revolution in the country where the majority of the population consist of small peasants can be accomplished only by a series of special, transitional measures which are not necessary at all in advanced capitalist countries where the hired work-hand constitutes an overwhelming majority in industry and agriculture.

It was necessary to take a series of transitional measures in our country, too.

As Marxism-Leninism teaches us, after the proletariat took the power into their own hands, it was necessary for the socialist transformation of small scale individual farming to develop industry to some extent which would supply farm implements, fertilizers, and other technical means to the countryside, and to enhance the political, ideological level of the peasants.

Industry in the North, the level of which had been low, was badly damaged by the Japanese imperialists at the time of their surrender. There was only a small number of technical personnel, and raw and other materials were insufficient. Moreover, the country was divided into two parts owing to the U.S. occupation of South Korea. Accordingly, a certain time was required for an all-round restoration of industry. Besides, many individual peasants were at a low level, politically and ideologically.

Under these conditions, small commodity economy in agriculture was destined to hold its leading position for a considerable length of time.

However, this did not mean that our agriculture was to develop along the capitalist path.

The tasks at the time confronting the people in the North were of a transitional character, that is, gradually going over to socialism by developing the national economy in a planned manner by relying on large-scale nationalized industries, while extending and developing the results of democratic reforms.

In order to restrain the growth of the capitalist sector in agriculture, the Workers' Party of Korea took a series of measures: the acreage of farm land an individual peasant could own was limited to 5 jungbo; buying and selling, mortgaging and renting of land were strictly prohibited; when the owner of land became unable to till it himself, he must hand it over to the local People's Committee to be distributed to the peasants with little land. (This land was equivalent to the state-owned in its nature and called the "leasehold.")

These measures, together with the thorough-going land reform, created very favourable conditions for the socialist transformation of agriculture.

For strengthening the economic relations between urban and rural districts, the system of tax-in-kind and a new credit system were introduced and the state-operated and consumers' co-op trade network was newly set up and expanded.

Following the democratic reforms, the rehabilitation and development of the national economy made rapid strides. As for agriculture, it shook off its feudal land-ownership and began to receive positive aid from socialist industry. As a result, already in 1948, grain output in the North exceeded the pre-war peak by 10.4 per cent. The North, once a provision-short area, was turned into a zone with surplus food.

From 1946 to 1949, the total agricultural output value increased by 51 per cent; of which grain increased by 40 per cent, cotton by 407 per cent, animal products by 85 per cent, silk cocoons by 193 per cent. Our agriculture could meet basically the demand of urban inhabitants and industry. In other words, a balance was reached to a certain extent between industry and agriculture. However, the mutual relation was not yet closer. This can be explained

by the fact that our industry was at the stage of rehabilitation, and, accordingly, its demand on agriculture was not so great. (In 1949, of the total industrial and agricultural output value, industry rated at 53.3 per cent.) On the other hand, agriculture kept relying on the individual peasants' small commodity economic sector, backward in technique.

Before liberation over 60 per cent of Korea's total industrial output was from North Korea, while only 30 per cent of marketable rice and 20 per cent of marketable wheat and barley came from North Korea.

Though more grain was available for marketing in the North with the growth of agricultural production after liberation, its amount was limited. It was inevitable that the rapidly growing industry would sooner or later find itself in contradiction with the economic foundation of individual farming. Moreover, it was self-evident that long-drawn backwardness in livestock breeding and in cultivation of industrial crops—the former held five per cent and the latter two per cent in agricultural produce in the days of Japanese imperialist rule—would not be easily eliminated under small commodity economy. What is more, under the small-scale, scattered individual peasant economy, it would be impossible to improve to a great extent the peasants' living and to do away with the source of exploitation and poverty once and for all in the countryside.

Thanks to the land reform, most of the poor peasants and hired farm hands, who had constituted the overwhelming majority of the peasant population, became middle peasants to be the main force in the countryside. However, there still remained some poor peasants, about 25 per cent of the peasant households, possible object of exploitation by the rich peasants and profiteers.

While giving material aid to the poor peasants and struggling against exploitation, the Workers' Party of Korea took steps to establish the state farms and stock farms and farm-machine hire stations which would play a leading role in transforming agriculture in socialist way and

show the broad peasant masses the advantage of large-scale farming and mechanization of agriculture.

During the three-year long war unleashed by the U.S. imperialists and traitorous Syngman Rheeites, our agriculture suffered greatly as our industry did. Rural villages were destroyed or burnt down, over 90,000 jungbo of farm land was lost and a great number of irrigation projects and river dikes were destroyed. The number of draught animals was reduced to about half compared with the pre-war days. Supply of chemical fertilizers, farm implements and various kinds of daily necessities was sharply cut down.

But our agriculture, even under the most difficult condition of war, not only successfully met the demands of both the front and the rear but advanced steadily towards socialism.

In view of the severe devastation the industrial establishments suffered in urban districts, the Party concentrated its main forces on agriculture. To meet the war difficulties squarely and restore the agricultural productive forces, the Party and Government, relying on the aid given by the peoples of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, widely encouraged the joint labour organization such as the ox-share and labour-exchange teams which had long been practised by the peasants in our country, while expanding greatly the state farms and stock farms and the network of farm-machine hire stations.

Already in the peaceful construction period before the war, the Party and Government began to set up state farms and stock farms by bringing grass and fallow land under cultivation and on the basis of some livestock farms and orchards confiscated in accordance with the Law on Land Reform. However, it was during the war time that the state farms began to make rapid development mainly for the purpose of rapidly restoring the severely war-damaged livestock breeding and supplying the front with necessary meat.

There were 16 state farms and stock farms including seven orchards covering an area of some 6,000-7,000 jungbo in the pre-war days. But there were 213 in 1953

with an area of more than 57,000 jungbo, including the province-run farms and stock farms. They played a great role for the rehabilitation and development of livestock breeding and fruit growing, meeting the demands of the front. Besides, these farms and stock farms newly established by rationally utilizing the fallow lands and mountain slopes provided the war refugees with jobs and made them settle down.

It was in the spring of 1950 when the farm machine-hire stations appeared. By 1953 their number increased from 5 to 15. The number of tractors increased from 150 to 500 (in terms of 15 h. p.).

During the war time, the peasants organized on a wide scale joint labour in various forms.

In the light of the difficulties created by the shortage of labour power, draught animals and farm implements, it was positively encouraged to rationally organize ox-share and labour-exchange teams on the principle of mutual aid and co-operation. As a result, from 1951 on, their significance and role were further heightened. The entire peasants came to realize through experience more keenly that without a closer co-operation in labour, successful farming in the war time was impossible. Consequently, in many districts, not only in the farm work but also in side-line production, a new form of cooperative labour, not merely of temporary, seasonal nature but of the year-round, began to emerge. And at the end of 1952 the Party and Government decided to organize and develop gradually side-line co-operatives among the peasants as one of the measures for improving the economic situation of poor peasants and fishermen. Moreover, financial and material aid was given to the newly organized co-operatives, a higher form than the ox-share and labour-exchange teams.

Though the number of the side-line co-ops in the countryside at that time was not big, some of them went beyond the livestock breeding and other side-lines, and began to extend gradually their collective activities to farming.

During the war time, in Kangwon Province, especial-

ly in the districts near the eastern and central fronts, numbers of the front joint work teams were organized.

The front joint work teams which were organized mostly with the young and middle-aged peasants after their families had been evacuated worked on the land while aiding the front all they could. In their initial stage, it must be pointed out, the front joint work teams had no rigid rules and regulations about governing themselves, but the teams gradually came to assume the specific features of co-operative economy from production to distribution. Membership of the teams ranged from 50 to 200. The front joint work team represented an embryonic co-op which emerged when the war was raging in full force.

By July 1953 when the Armistice Agreement was signed, they grew into 174 agricultural co-ops (of which 72 were sideline co-ops) embracing 2,400 peasant households.

Mention should be made of the fact that all these socialist forms in the rural economy such as the state farms and stock farms, farm machine-hire stations and agricultural co-ops in embryo made further development in the course of the war, and, overcoming difficulties, made a great contribution to the growth of agricultural production in the war time. Grain output in the second year of the war was greater than in the first year, and that in the third year bigger than in the second year. Socialist agriculture made great contribution to increase grain output and was a positive factor in promoting the socialist transformation of agriculture. All these results, as Premier Kim Il Sung remarked in his "For the Rehabilitation and Development of the Post-war National Economy," were attained thanks to the agricultural policy of the Workers' Party of Korea in the early days of the war for a gradual conversion of the scattered individual farming into co-operative one while developing the state farms.



II. DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

1. Objective Requirement for Socialist Transformation of Agriculture and Actual Conditions for the Develop- ment of Agricultural Co-operative Movement

When the just Fatherland Liberation War against the armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rheeites ended in an historic victory for the Korean people, the people in the North were confronted with the most important and difficult task of speedily rehabilitating the severely devastated national economy and developing it in order to lay a foundation for a self-supporting national economy and improve rapidly the deteriorated people's living conditions.

For carrying out this task, the Workers' Party of Korea laid out the general line of giving priority to the development of heavy industry while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture. Agricultural co-operativization was one of the most important prerequisites for carrying through this general line.

During the war the material and technical foundation of agriculture had been severely destroyed and there existed a serious shortage of labour power and draught animals. It was obvious, therefore, that so long as the individual farming remained as it was, it was impossible to hope for the rapid development of agricultural production and solve the food question, an acute problem that we faced after the cessation of hostilities. Nor could the priori-

ty growth of heavy industry and rapid development of light industry be ensured, nor the development of the national economy as a whole speeded up. (The gross agricultural output value in 1953 decreased to 76 per cent compared with the pre-war year of 1949, of which grain dropped to 88 per cent, vegetables to 58 per cent, cotton to 23 per cent, fruits to 72 per cent and silk cocoon to 58 per cent.)

In the post-war period, with the enormous aid from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, our industries have been rapidly reconstructed, far bigger in their scope than before, and equipped with up-to-date machines.

Under these circumstances, agriculture had to keep pace with the qualitative changes taking place in the field of industry.

On the contradiction between industry and agriculture which was becoming acute in the post-war days, Comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out as follows: "Thus the contradiction between the socialist industry and the individual peasant economy was pregnant with the danger of creating a grave disproportion between the rapidly recovering, developing and qualitatively changing industry and the rural economy which was being rehabilitated at a snail's pace in the postwar situation prevailing in our country." (*On the Victory of Socialist Agricultural Co-operativization and Further Development of Agriculture in Our Country*)

Under the condition in which the peasants' living had deteriorated to the extreme and the individual farming existed, it was impossible to solve the question of poor peasants, the most acute one in the postwar days, and to do away with the source of exploitation. During the war our agriculture was further deteriorated and the number of poor peasants increased to about 40 per cent of the total peasants. In this situation, agricultural co-operativization was the only way out of predicament for our peasants. With agricultural co-operativization alone, it was possible to overcome the lack of labour power, draught animals and

farm implements and all other difficulties, and ensure the rapid rehabilitation and development of agricultural productive forces and enhancement of the peasants' living standards.

Unless agriculture had been placed under a socialist system, it would have been impossible to successfully remodel enterprisers, tradesmen, and handicraftsmen in urban districts, who, though they were small in number, were closely related with individual peasants. (In 1953, the private capitalist and small commodity economic sectors held 3.9 per cent in the gross industrial output value, and 32.5 per cent in the value of retail trade.)

Agricultural co-operativization was, therefore, a law-governed requirement for social, economic development in the transitional period.

The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held in August 1953, laying down the basic line for the post-war national economic reconstruction and development, put forth the historic task of agricultural co-operativization.

However, it must be pointed out that the agricultural co-operativization movement was launched under very unfavourable conditions, that is, the war damage was great, the country remained split, and there was hardly any farm machines to speak of.

In this difficult period, the Party took the policy of agricultural co-operativization. It was a most timely policy. Should such policy not have been taken after the war because our revolution was at the stage of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution so far as the whole of Korea was concerned and because we lacked heavy industry to provide agriculture with modern machines, it is quite obvious what the results would have been.

To be sure, there were some who contended that agricultural co-operativization was premature. They used to say: "Our country still remains split," "We have no farm machines," and so forth.

First of all, they did not fully understand what the lawful objective requirement had arisen in the course of the devel-

opment of the national economy in the northern part of the country, and that unless the democratic base in the North, the source of our revolution, was strengthened politically, economically and culturally, the country's unification is quite impossible.

Socialist construction in the North, including agricultural co-operativization, is an inevitable requirement arising in the course of the social and economic development in the North.

South Korea has not been liberated yet, but we cannot stop a forward movement in the North and wait for the liberation of South Korea. Nothing can hold back the revolution and social, economic development in the North. Only by strengthening further the democratic base in the North by carrying out socialist construction, can the country's peaceful unification be accelerated.

Second, they did not understand fully our peculiar conditions of land and agricultural production. Without co-operativization, the introduction of mechanization and advanced technique would be impossible in our country.

Such dogmatic, formalistic views were severely criticized in time by the Party.

This should not be taken, however, to mean that the division of the country and the technically low level of agriculture presented no adverse condition to the agricultural co-operativization. To a certain extent they did. But they were not fatal factors which could make the agricultural co-operativization impossible.

In launching the agricultural co-operative movement in the North, the Party took account of the necessity and matured conditions for the movement.

Premier Kim Il Sung said, "The agricultural co-operative movement is a reflection of matured conditions at the present stage of the development of the country and the lawful, objective requirement of social development." (*For the Rehabilitation and Development of the Post-war National Economy*, Korean Ed., p. 346)

There were favourable conditions for agricultural co-operative movement: the people's democratic power was established in the country; the socialist industry was

playing the leading role in the national economy; and the land reform and other democratic reforms had been thoroughly carried out and especially the worker-peasant alliance strengthened through the ordeal of the Fatherland Liberation War. Moreover, since the peaceful construction period before the war, such socialist form of economy as the state farms and stock farms, farm machine-hire stations, consumers' co-ops, peasants' banks, etc. had come into being in the countryside. Then there were such popular joint work teams as the ox-share and labour-exchange teams, which had a long standing in the countryside, from which the co-operative economy began to emerge. Furthermore, the enormous material and technical aid given by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries enabled us to use their rich experiences of agricultural co-operative movement to good advantage.

Marxism-Leninism teaches us that under the small peasant economy, as a rule, it is impossible to fully introduce modern farm machines and up-to-date technique.

So long as the land owned by peasants was too small and the individual peasant economy prevailed, the introduction of machines and advanced farming method was hampered. Had we waited the completion of mechanization before we started co-operativization, it would have brought about a stagnation in agriculture and eventually bankruptcy.

Therefore, the agricultural co-operativization could not be postponed until the completion of industrialization and mechanization.

To be sure, industrialization would provide favourable conditions for agricultural co-operativization. However, when we take into account the peculiar conditions of our country, it was the only correct and practical way to effect agricultural co-operativization in conformity with the matured objective requirement, create favourable conditions for mechanization of agriculture and then accelerate socialist industrialization.

As everyone knows, co-operative labour, no matter how simple it may be, is far superior to scattered, individual labour. Marx pointed out in the *Capital* as follows:

"Not only have we here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new power, namely, the collective power of masses." And it was Lenin who said that the transition from individual peasant economy to joint economy will raise labour productivity 2-3-fold and save 2-3-fold in man-power.

In the post-war days it was urgent to rapidly restore and develop agriculture. To cope with the situation our peasants had to take the advantage of co-operative labour. Taking this actual situation into full consideration, our Party put forth the task of carrying out agricultural co-operativization prior to industrialization. However, this should not be taken to mean that technical revolution was neglected in completing socialist transformation of agriculture. The Party, putting forth the task of agricultural co-operativization, paid special attention to the development of heavy industry for technical reform in all branches of the national economy including agriculture. At the same time it was expected to receive up-to-date farm machines from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

2. Party's Policy on Agricultural Co-operativization and Its Successful Implementation

Embarking upon the road of co-operativization, the Party had to direct serious consideration to the following special circumstances. Peasants had little experiences in organizing and running the co-ops, their cultural and technical standards were low, and the private ownership of land was still in effect.

Consequently, the Workers' Party of Korea took the road of organizing several co-operatives in each county while preserving the private ownership of land and other means of production. And as experiences were accumulated, co-ops were organized on an extensive scale.

It must be pointed out that the Party, in guiding the

co-operative movement, paid profound concern towards the attitude of all strata of peasants.

The basic class policy of the Party in rural areas was to rely firmly on the poor peasants, strengthen the alliance with the middle peasants, and to restrict and remould the rich peasants. At the time when the co-operative movement was started, the stratum of peasants was divided into poor and middle peasants, its ratio being roughly 40:60. During the war, the rich peasants dropped from 2-3 per cent to 0.6. Most of the middle peasants were those who came into being after the land reform.

Poor peasants who realized the importance of joining the co-ops came out most strongly supporting the co-operativization, and most of the middle peasants, too, readily approved co-operativization from the start. However, there were some middle peasants who, wavering and hesitating, sat on the fence, while the rich peasants were indifferent or hostile to the policy.

To those wavering middle peasants the Party used the means of explanation and persuasion, letting them see everything with their own eyes. Towards the rich peasants, the Party strictly prohibited the practice of exploitation, but kept the door open for those who sincerely wanted to work as socialist working people. The Party took necessary steps to take sanctions against the small number of rich peasants who were trying to undermine the co-operative movement.

Lenin's program for agricultural co-operatives and the historic experience of the Soviet Union showed that it was of importance for developing the co-operative movement to correctly define the forms of co-operative economy on the principle of combining the individual interests with the common interests in accordance with the development of agricultural productive forces.

Hence, our Party, taking into consideration the experiences in the People's Democracies and turning to account the forms of ox-share teams and labour-exchange teams, formulated the three forms of agricultural co-operative in accordance with different extent of preparedness and economic status of peasants.

The first form was the permanent mutual-aid team. In this case work is done jointly but the land is individually owned. This is an embryonic socialist form.

The second form was the semi-socialist form. In this case the land is pooled for common economy and over 80 per cent of incomes are distributed to the members according to the number of work-days and 20 per cent according to the size of land contributed.

The third form is a complete socialist form. In this case the land is turned into co-op ownership and incomes distributed only according to work done.

The draft animals and farm implements were not turned into co-operative ownership automatically. It was according to the wish of the owner whether they belonged to the co-ops or remained in private ownership. However, draft animals and farm implements were used for mutual benefit and duly paid if they were turned into co-operative ownership.

The three forms of agricultural co-operative and the method of pooling the means of production clearly reflect the policy of our Party on completing the co-operativization by firmly relying on the poor peasants and consolidating the alliance with the middle peasants.

At the initial stage of the co-operativization, our Party adhered to the principle of the gradual development of co-ops both in form and size, "from an elementary form to an advanced one and from a small scale one to a large scale one." But rejecting a mechanical interpretation of the principle, the Party instructed that if the level of the consciousness of the peasants was high and managerial personnel were well prepared, it was possible and necessary to form from the beginning a co-op of the advanced form on a comparatively big scale.

In organizing agricultural co-operatives, the Party adhered strictly to the Leninist principles, while taking every precaution against wrong tendencies. Some co-ops were only interested in the rapid quantitative growth and advanced forms of co-operative in contravention of the voluntary principle and mutual benefits. Then there were

some who took such attitude that the co-operative movement should take its natural course, not comprehending the growing demand of the peasant masses. It was of tremendous significance for the future development of the co-operative movement that co-ops were organized with the poor peasants and the most active elements in each locality, and that the Party and Government concentrated their leading forces on making these first co-ops register a great success in production, thereby demonstrating by examples the advantage of the co-operative economy to the broad masses of peasants.

The per unit area yield of grain of over 1,000 co-ops organized on an experimental basis during the period 1953-54, was 10-50 per cent higher than that of individual farming, and their cash incomes 2-7 times bigger.

The agro-stock and agro-fishing co-ops organized in mountainous and coastal areas where poor peasants made up a greater proportion also registered a great success, adhering to the slogan of the Party: "Make the best use of the mountains and the sea!"

Though such excellent results were achieved by the co-ops at the experimental stage, some deviations and shortcomings cropped up. Some leading personnel in agriculture revealed impetuous tendencies, while others took a passive attitude towards the creative zeal of peasants for organizing co-ops. Then there were some who, on the plea of strict adherence to voluntary principle, chose to sit down and wait for the organization of co-ops to take place spontaneously.

In some villages, where there had been already two or three co-ops organized, some contended that no more co-ops were needed. Even there were some cases where the newly organized co-ops were refused registration for several months.

Such conservative tendency was also revealed in deciding the form and size of co-ops. In some rural areas, sticking to the "principle" of distributing shares according to the land invested, some leading personnel demanded that the third form of co-op which the peasants had set up at their own will be reorganized into a second form. And

there were some who maintained that the membership of a co-op should not exceed 20 to 30 households.

Such conservative tendencies at the experimental stage were not without reason.

Sometimes the policy of organizing several co-ops in each county on an experimental basis was mechanically interpreted. Then there were some cases when the leading personnel lacked a deep understanding of the inner life of the new co-op. They fell short of experience and knowledge necessary for guiding the co-ops.

Undesirable tendencies, however, were not limited to the leading personnel. In one or another shape, they were also found among peasants. Illustrative of this was their failure to observe the principle of mutual benefits.

Excess was to be noted in turning or not turning the land, draft animals and means of production into co-operative ownership in accordance with the rules. When the privately-owned property was placed under co-operative ownership, there were cases when correct evaluation and compensation were not duly made.

Also shortcomings were found in management. Some co-ops, without careful consideration of their economic foundation, invested a large sum of fixed capital in building facilities beyond their power or bought large-size farm machines, and wasted money and materials for non-productive purposes. There were cases when the co-ops attempted to run too big a factory or go into trade on the pretext of running a side-line business.

There were many more cases of this nature differing only in degree: violation of the principle of democracy in management, lack of planning in the organization of production and labour, levelling in calculating workdays and distributing shares, improper control of common properties, utter neglect or excessive accumulation of joint funds, etc.

Our co-ops have come to see, through their own experiences, and thanks to the guidance and assistance of the Party and government organs, what harmful consequences would be entailed by those shortcomings and

defects, and worked out proper measures to correct such shortcomings and defects. Needless to say, rooting them out was a major question to be dealt with. Experience in the first year of co-ops proved valuable for the further development of co-operativization. On the basis of the tremendous achievements scored at the experimental stage, the co-operative movement developed on a mass scale from 1955, with the mass influx of middle peasants, the main body of the rural population, besides poor peasants. Co-operatives embraced 1.2 per cent of peasant households at the end of 1953 to 31.8 per cent at the end of 1954, then to 44.7 per cent in the spring of 1955.

With the rapid development of the co-operative movement on a mass scale, many deviations and negative phenomena cropped up in the organizational work. The major deviations were to be seen in the hasty "leftist" tendencies in the work of organizing and guiding co-ops. In some places, the organizational work was done not infrequently in an administrative manner or in a "hot-and-cold" fashion on the pretext of overtaking and surpassing other districts.

Some leading personnel organized recklessly some large-scale co-ops on the ground that it would tend to "simplify" the guidance work, underestimating the lower forms of co-op or encroaching upon the interests of individual peasants on the plea of co-operative's interest.

Negative phenomena also appeared among the peasants themselves, reflecting the frame of mind of the middle peasants; some peasants with comparatively stable economic foundations organized co-ops exclusively among themselves refusing admittance of poor peasants; the acreage of kitchen gardens was expanded in violation of the rules, some able-bodied members of a family were refused to join the co-op. And they tried to raise the evaluation beyond market prices of draught animals, farm implements and others which they contributed to the co-op.

There were even cases when some hostile elements taking advantage of the mass organization of co-ops, wormed their way into them to occupy leading positions under the guise of active peasants.

For the purpose of rapidly making riddance of the above-mentioned deviations and negative phenomena manifested in the organization of co-ops and ensuring a steady development of the entire co-ops, our Party put forward its basic line of ensuring both the numerical growth and qualitative consolidation of co-ops and completing socialist transformation of agriculture. As the co-operative movement entered the new phase of mass development, the most urgent question was consolidation of the co-ops organizationally and economically.

It was of prime importance for the qualitative consolidation and steady development of co-ops to solve the question of cadres, including the chairmen. The cadre problem became further complicated due to the fact that many rural Party members and cadres trained and brought up during post-liberation period were killed during the war.

Considering the source of managerial personnel should be found among the co-op members, our Party appointed as managerial cadres active members who enjoyed the confidence of peasants and who had rich experiences in farming, and particularly, the beleft families of patriotic martyrs, servicemen's families, and ex-servicemen. Also, special concern was paid to training and reeducating them at the central or provincial co-op managerial cadres' schools, and raising the level of their business ability through short courses and experience-swapping meetings.

At the same time, to make the managerial cadres become true servants of the people, to establish the mass style of work and to bring their work closer to production, the desk work was simplified so that the cadres could participate in production.

Historic experience in the agricultural co-operativization in the Soviet Union showed that success or failure of a collective farm depends on who stands in the van and leads the work of the collective farm. Therefore, our Party directed the main force of the Party and Government to the guidance work to young co-ops. Socialist order and system were to be established in the rapidly growing co-ops, production to be increased gradually, the life of mem-

bers to be improved and the Party's position in rural areas to be consolidated further.

To this end, the principle of correctly combining the day-to-day guidance with the intensive guidance was adhered to, and the central guidance with the local guidance.

However, in the early period of the co-operative movement, the guidance work could not keep pace with the rapid changes taking place in the countryside.

Under these circumstances, the Party rendered every assistance to the leading workers to correctly understand the inner life of the co-operative and acquire relevant economic and technical knowledge. And this helped greatly the local Party and government organs to give better guidance to the co-ops. Yet, it was far from removing the discrepancy between the rapid quantitative growth of the co-ops and their qualitative changes.

The most effective method of solving this question was intensive guidance, which the Party conducted on a nation-wide scale once or twice a year by mobilizing thousands of leading workers of Pyongyang and local districts.

In this way, the Party succeeded in exposing and correcting negative phenomena. Any distortion of the co-operativization policy was corrected, able managerial cadres were selected and allocated, democratic principles were put into practice fully in the co-ops, socialist labour discipline and the rational system of distributing shares were firmly established, the planned development of co-ops was enforced, and the members' socialist ideology and consciousness were enhanced. At the same time, through this guidance work, the managerial staff of the co-ops raised the level of political and managerial work. And the Party and government workers who were mobilized for this work acquainted themselves fully with the inner life of the co-operative, enabling them to become more competent in the guidance work.

The struggle for implementing the decision of the December 1956 Plenum of the Party Central Committee, which is of historic significance in the post-war socialist

construction, brought about also an epoch-making change in the field of guidance of co-ops. The Party dispatched Presidium members of the Party Central Committee and other Party and government leaders to co-ops. They discussed with the co-op members the successful fulfilment of the arduous tasks of the First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961), learning what difficulties and other urgent questions the co-op members faced and what would be the best way to overcome the difficulties and solve the questions. This served as an important factor in bringing about the epoch-making upsurge in agricultural production. Bureaucratic, formalistic leadership and conservatism formerly observed in the field of guidance of the rural economy were shattered to pieces and the creativeness and inventiveness of the masses of the co-op members were stimulated greatly.

Proceeding from the principle that the main task of co-ops is to raise the yield of agricultural produce and members' incomes by organizing economic activities correctly, greater concern has been paid to the reasonable utilization of natural conditions including land and the constant growth of labour productivity. Under the circumstances in which each co-op member owned no more than 0.9 jungbo of land on an average, they should turn the co-operative economy into the best use. Every possible help and guidance was given to raise per unit area yield by adopting the principle of planting proper crop on proper soil, raising the land utility rate and introducing widely various advanced intensive farming, and at the same time to develop in a diversified and planned way farming, livestock farming, sericulture, fruit growing and fishery under the natural and economic conditions of the locality.

In order to stimulate enthusiasm for greater production and material interests of co-op members measures were taken for reorganizing the emulation drive of the past, i.e. under individual economy to meet the new situation. Moreover, a wide-scale movement was started for establishing model agricultural co-operatives. A new system was established; when work teams and sub-teams overfulfilled production assignments, those teams were to be awarded in kind and cash. Contrary to this, when they

did not fulfil their plans, a certain number of workdays were deducted.

In order to relieve the women members, whose number was more than half of the co-op membership, from their everyday household chores, more day-nurseries, kindergartens, laundries, dress-making shops and other public service establishments were built. All this greatly improved the working conditions for the women members. And it must be added that these measures which had not been seen at the experimental stage showed a new development in the co-operative movement.

Particular attention was paid to keeping the balance between accumulation and expenditure of the co-ops with a view to consistently carrying out the extended reproduction and guaranteeing the systematic enhancement of the living standards of co-op members.

Proceeding from the principle that, until co-op members completely recover from war damages, first consideration should be given to the improvement of co-op members' life and the consolidation of their economic foundation, the rate of reserve funds was limited below 5 per cent of incomes while greater shares were divided among co-op members.

Lenin stressed that every social system arises only with the financial assistance of a definite class and the system which the socialist state must assist more than the usual is the cooperative system.

This theme of Lenin was of particular importance in the realities of our country where agricultural co-ops were organized and developed on the war ruins.

Under the guidance of our Party, the state investment in the rural economy increased steadily.

Altogether 120 million won was invested by the state in the field of rural economy between 1954 and 1958. Irrigation projects and river dykes were built, the network of machine-hire stations was extended and technical personnel in this field were trained in large numbers. In addition, the state appropriated enormous funds to re-

habilitate or construct chemical fertilizer factories and farm implements factories.

This made it possible to lay and consolidate successfully the material and technical foundation of the severely ruined rural economy in a short period after the war.

Besides, the state loaned over 300,000 tons of provisions and seed grains, and more than 243 million won of farming fund to economically weak co-ops and poor peasants. Moreover the state cancelled more than 160,000 tons of tax-in-kind and loaned grains and more than 14 million won of loan.

In 1956 a system of paying fixed amount of tax-in-kind was enforced throughout the country to lighten the burden of the peasants and raise their interests in production, reducing markedly the rate of tax-in-kind. Measures were also taken to reduce another 5 per cent of the amount of tax-in-kind in co-ops and considerably increase the purchasing price of agricultural produce.

In the post-war period the Party and government bodies sent tens of thousands of ex-servicemen and many junior and senior middle school graduates to the countryside to relieve the acute labour shortage.

Moreover, every year in farming seasons numerous office employees, students and servicemen were mobilized to help with farming. Every year millions of workdays were given to the countryside.

All the successes won by our agricultural co-operatives in overcoming hardships and difficulties in the early post-war period cannot be imagined apart from the concern shown by the state.

The state has always given special favour to agricultural co-ops and at the same time has shown careful concern for individual peasants, too.

Along with the development of co-operative economy, measures were taken to correct in time even the slightest tendencies to underestimate individual peasant economy. And co-ops gave private peasants every possible assistance, materially and technically. This greatly conduced to bringing individual peasants into the co-ops.

From the experiences gained in the process of organizing agricultural co-ops we have learned the following facts:

Firstly, the level of political and ideological consciousness of co-op members and the observance of principle of voluntariness in organizational work exerted decisive influence on the work of co-ops. Agricultural co-ops organized with politically and ideologically prepared persons on the principle of strict voluntariness achieved successes from the early days of organization and developed rapidly. On the other hand, some co-ops organized in violation of these principles failed to set up discipline and order, their production was also meagre and unity of ideology and will among co-op members was lacking. There were even a few isolated cases of members leaving the co-ops.

Secondly, ability and responsibility of the managerial personnel of co-ops and their popularity among the masses constituted decisive factors for the development of co-ops. The co-ops run by able and responsible cadres achieved great successes in production. In such co-ops, discipline and order were well established and things moved along in a planned manner. However, some co-ops run by incompetent cadres gained nothing but negative results.

Thirdly, it is important to take into consideration the preparedness of co-op members, and the ability of the managerial cadres in particular, in deciding the size of co-ops. The too big co-ops organized in the early days and those which had been expanded into too big ones after their formation made progress at a snail's pace because of inability of the managerial cadres and irrational organization of labour. Subsequently measures were taken for dividing too large co-ops into smaller ones and for merging too small co-ops into larger ones, based strictly upon the voluntary will of the co-op members. Special attention was paid to the merger of small co-ops in particular. The co-ops which were unable to develop further because they were so small in size, or those co-ops in which rational farming was impossible because their land and irrigation facilities were interlocked, were merged. The premature merger at

the managerial personnel's judgment was strictly prohibited.

Fourthly, the enemy within the co-ops is more dangerous than those without.

Fifthly, it was revealed that the organizational, political activities of the Party organizations and the role of the Party members in co-ops were of great significance for strengthening the co-ops.

Sixthly, the co-ops in which the local Party organizations and Government organs had promptly corrected defects made rapid development. But those which were otherwise remained in a backward state.

From the experiences accumulated in the management of the co-ops we have learned the following facts:

First. Most important in consolidating and developing agricultural co-ops organizationally and economically is ensuring democracy in every way. In such co-ops where the members, as the masters of the co-ops, had taken part positively in the work of the co-ops and democracy had been ensured, everything went along without a hitch resulting in a rapid development of co-ops. On the other hand, there was a small number of co-ops where democracy had not been ensured. In such cases the co-ops lagged behind.

Second. Great difference was to be noted in harvest and income between the co-ops that set up the production plans in conformity with the natural, economic conditions and organized efficiently the work, and the co-ops which did the contrary.

Third. Rational organization of labour, strict labour discipline, the correct calculation and assessment of work-days and rigid observance of socialist remuneration system constituted key factors for the development of co-ops. In such co-ops where all this had been well observed labour enthusiasm of the co-op members reached a high level, labour productivity was stepped up and eventually all the work carried out in time. But, in the co-ops where no such principles were observed the results were very negligible.

Lastly, if the co-ops reaped better harvests and raised incomes compared with the time when the members had been individual farmers, and compared with the neighbour-

ing individual peasants they produced a good effect on them. It promoted the desire of the individual peasants to join the co-ops, while strengthening the unity of the co-op members. On the contrary, such co-ops, though small in number, which failed to raise their harvest and incomes had a bad effect on the neighbouring individual peasants.

At the stage of mass development of agricultural co-operative movement, more valuable, abundant experiences were accumulated than at the experimental stage, which constituted a sure guarantee for the further development of the agricultural co-operative movement.

The Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea convened in April 1956 set forth the task of bringing the agricultural co-operative movement to a successful conclusion. It was at such a time when socialism was taking the offensive in all branches of the national economy.

In order to complete agricultural co-operativization at the earliest possible date, our Party was greatly concerned about the rich peasants who remained outside of co-ops, while concentrating guidance on such districts where the rate of co-operativization was low.

As of June 1956, while about 80 per cent of the total peasant households were embraced in co-ops in North and South Pyongan and South Hamkyung Provinces, the rate of co-operativization was 56 per cent in Jagang Province, a mountainous district where the villages are scattered and geographical conditions are unfavourable, 44 per cent in the neighbourhood of Pyongyang where the peasants were interested in trading and 42 per cent in Kaesong and its neighbourhood, newly liberated area. Some peculiarities were to be noted in Kaesong and its neighbouring villages. The area had not been so long under the people's democratic system, for they had been liberated not long ago and had some peculiarity in landownership and other aspects.

In view of such situation, the Party had to carry out the organizational work in the mountainous areas, city suburbs, and newly liberated areas. The problem of rich peasants who still remained outside the co-operatives had to be solved.

In mountainous areas, measures were taken to organize small-scale independent combined work teams taking into account the fact that the people were living scattered and to set up joint livestock farms to bring together the peasants who lived far apart from each other.

In the rural villages adjacent to towns, where the affairs of individual peasants were closely linked with private traders, agricultural co-operativization was carried out in parallel with the socialist transformation of the individual traders and enterprisers.

Taking into consideration the fact that in the newly liberated area the political and cultural level of peasants was generally low while the desire for the private land ownership was comparably strong, the Party concentrated efforts on penetrating the policies of the Party and Government among them. In particular, efforts were directed to smashing the intrigues designed by such anti-Party and anti-revolutionary elements as the overthrown landed gentry, capitalists and pro-Japanese elements, and wiping out the evil consequences therefrom, while strengthening the work of bringing up the nucleus members. Moreover, the Party helped the co-operative members choose a form of co-operatives which is most suitable to their actual situation.

As for the rich peasants, as already mentioned above, the Party observed the principle of remoulding them by peaceful means, instead of liquidation by the method of confiscation. This was possible because the socialist revolutionary forces were strong, whereas the position of rich peasants was insignificant.

Along with the individual industrialists and traders in cities and towns, most of rich peasants came to realize through the practical experiences in the revolutionary and historical development in our country that the only way out was to become socialist working people. Never relaxing the education of the rich peasants, the Party concentrated main efforts on consolidating the already organized co-operatives organizationally and economically, proceeding from the principle that "if the co-operatives are strength-

ened and their members' life is better than that of the individual peasants, they will join the co-operatives of their own accord." (From the speech delivered by Premier Kim Il Sung at the Meeting of Managerial Workers of Co-operatives in South Pyongan Province.) At the same time, the Party attached great importance to the co-operatives of low forms.

With the strengthening of the economic foundation of agricultural co-operatives as a whole and the collapse of the last foothold for exploitation in the countryside, the most stubborn rich peasants came willingly and voluntarily into the co-operatives.

It confirmed once more the correctness of the Party policy on transforming rich peasants by peaceful means.

However, this is not to say that the socialist transformation in the countryside was carried out without a class struggle. On the contrary, it accompanied a severe class struggle. The overthrown exploiting classes did not give up the wild fancy of restoring the old system and the American imperialists nesting in South Korea and, their puppet, the Syngman Rhee clique were in a frenzy to carry out subversive activities against the northern part of our Republic. The class enemies resorted to every vile scheme to disintegrate the agricultural co-operatives from within and without: reactionary rumours vilifying the Party policy on the agricultural co-operativization were spread, the joint properties of the co-ops were the targets of their malignant activities, schemes were made to undermine the production plans, and even attempts were made on co-op cadres' lives.

Particular mention should be made of the fact that as the agricultural co-operativization was nearing completion and the victory of socialism was fortified in cities and the countryside, the machinations, sabotages and subversive activities of the counter-revolutionaries who lost their last foothold became all the more vicious. Consequently, the Party steadily waged vigorously a mass struggle against the counter-revolutionary elements, while strengthening the political and ideological work among the peas-

ants for enhancing their socialist consciousness and revolutionary vigilance.

In this way, every scheme of the enemy in the rural areas was exposed and smashed, while safeguarding the gains of socialism, enhancing the revolutionary spirit and political enthusiasm of peasants and fortifying them with firmer confidence in the ultimate victory.

Experiences showed that only by suppressing the enemy who attempted to restore the old system and by taking appropriate measures against a handful of those elements who opposed the co-operative movement, could we promote the all-round development of co-operative movement and socialist transformation of rich peasants.

By the end of August 1958, the tasks laid down at the Party Third Congress to complete the agricultural co-operativization by the end of 1961 had been victoriously accomplished. And it goes without saying that all this was possible because of the Party's correct agricultural co-operative line and its guidance in conformity with the concrete reality of our country.

The agricultural co-operativization also promoted the socialist remoulding of private traders and enterprisers in cities. With the co-operativization of the individual peasant economy the capitalist elements in cities lost the last foothold. Thus, in our country the co-operativization of agriculture and the socialist transformation of private trade and industry ran parallel and were completed almost at the same time. And the fundamental question of the transitional period, "Who will win?" had been completely solved in favour of socialism both in cities and rural villages.

The agricultural co-operativization was a great revolution in our countryside. Small-scale individual peasant economy based upon the private ownership of the means of production that had existed for thousands of years has been wiped out once and for all. And our rural communities have been turned into socialist communities.

The completion of agricultural co-operativization made it possible to solve completely the contradiction existing between the large-scale socialist industry and small commodity individual peasant economy and to ensure the

balanced development of industry and agriculture. And the economic relations between town and the countryside have been further strengthened.

In this way, the worker-peasant alliance, the political basis of our people's democratic system and the basic motive power of our revolution, has been further consolidated on a new socialist basis and our Party's position in rural areas and revolutionary democratic base in the northern part further strengthened.

3. Major Characteristics of Agricultural Co-operativization

The agricultural co-operative movement from the experimental stage to the stage of completion in our country was, first of all, characterised by the rapid speed of development. Another characteristic is that an advanced type, the third form, of agricultural co-ops occupies an absolute majority.

Growth of Co-operativization (in percentages)

	Co-op farm households	Land under co-ops
1953	1.2	0.6
1954	31.8	30.9
1955	49.0	48.6
1956	80.9	77.9
1957	95.6	93.7
Aug. 1958	100	100

Growth of Agricultural Co-ops of Various Forms

	The number of co-ops	Second form of co-ops (in percentages)	Third form of co-ops (in percentages)
1953	806	—	—
1954	10,098	21.5	78.5
1955	12,132	7.8	92.2

1956	15,825	2.5	97.5
1957	16,032	1.2	98.8
Aug. 1958	13,309	0	100

As shown above, the agricultural co-operative movement in Korea maintained an unprecedentedly rapid tempo and the co-operativization was completed only in 4-5 years. Moreover, from the first days of the movement, the overwhelming majority of co-ops were organized in the third form. In August 1958 all co-ops took the third form. It must be pointed out that co-ops were organized with little technical reconstruction of agriculture, but the agricultural co-operativization was carried out at high speed.

And then the agricultural co-ops were organized on the basis of private landownership but the overwhelming majority of them took the third form from the initial stage of co-operativization.

This fact represents the most important characteristic of our agricultural co-operativization. All this was possible, thanks first of all to the high political consciousness and revolutionary spirit of peasants and because the alignment of class forces was decisively favourable for agricultural co-operativization.

Particularly, it can be explained by the fact that during the great Fatherland Liberation War, preliminary conditions were created for the peasants to organize voluntarily agricultural co-ops under the guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The Korean peasantry has a revolutionary tradition of fighting for land and freedom under Japanese imperialist rule. After liberation the peasants were tempered all the more through the land reform and the hard trial of the Fatherland Liberation War.

In the course of the war they saw more clearly the barbarity of the U.S. imperialists and the reactionary nature of the landowner-bourgeois system which the U.S. imperialists were intending to force upon the Korean people.

Through the bitter class struggle against the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique and the resistance of

the overthrown exploiting class, the toiling peasants were more closely united around the Party and their revolutionary spirit was unprecedentedly heightened. And, fully appreciating the cause of our revolution and the correctness of the Party's policy, they had firm confidence that victory would be always with them if they followed the directives of the Party.

Under the guidance of the working class, the worker-peasant alliance was further strengthened and the Party's position in the rural village consolidated greatly.

Though the Party lost many of its core members in the rural villages during the war, the Party trained a force of excellent Party members and reinforced Party organizations in every village by bringing up a new core of members among peasants. And the Party members in the rural villages stood in the van of agricultural co-operativization.

In the countryside, the revolutionary forces grew mightier, while the forces of opposition were extremely weak.

As mentioned above, the landowner class was liquidated and the rich peasant economy weakened in the course of enforcing the land reform. Moreover, the forces hostile to the agricultural co-operativization were all the more weakened in the process of the bitter class struggle during the war time.

This fact was one of the important conditions for accelerating the smooth development of agricultural co-operative movement.

The historical experiences of the great Soviet Union showed that for the socialist transformation of agriculture, first of all, the mass movement for collective farms should be waged among the peasants, and the peasants themselves should be convinced of the advantages of collective farming and take this road of their own accord. To this end, the work should be carefully done. Of course, for this a certain length of time was needed.

Preliminary conditions for co-operativization in our country were already matured during the war time. Overcoming the difficult conditions in which manpower, draught animals and farm implements were in short, the peasants

carried on successfully their farming by strengthening ox-share and labour-exchange teams. Most of them fully recognized the necessity and superiority of collective work.

The rise of revolutionary spirit and political and ideological level of the peasants, the steady growth of socialist sector in the countryside after the liberation, and enhancement of its leading role exerted great influence in helping the peasants to see the necessity and advantage of collective work.

The organization of consumers' co-operatives embracing the broad popular masses in the countryside and the establishment of peasants' banks gave, to a certain extent, the peasants co-operative education and training in the field of commodity circulation and credit. With the expansion of state farms and stock farms and the machine-hire stations, the advantages of mechanization of agriculture and large scale farming were vividly demonstrated.

The embryonic co-operative economy, which appeared for the first time during the war time, developed rapidly in the post-war period. As already mentioned, this fact is linked with the above-mentioned material and ideological foundations.

It should be also pointed out that at the experimental stage of co-operativization, the first few agricultural co-ops organized in every county achieved great successes, demonstrating the superiority of co-operative economy.

The successes are linked with the specific features of landownership created by the land reform and small-scale farming. After the land reform the Party made it impossible to turn the land into a means of exploitation or to concentrate the land again into the hands of individuals. If a peasant, who had received land, could not work it, the Government put this land under the management of the local People's Committees. In July 1953, such land totalled 530,000 jungbo, over one fourth of the total arable land.

Therefore private landownership by toiling peasants was fundamentally different from the private landownership of the past.

It is, in essence, the transitional form of private land-ownership which should gradually and inevitably switch over to the socialist-collective ownership of the land.

The specific features of such landownership had no small influence on the conception of the peasants about landownership.

The small and equal size of plots of land owned by the peasants must also be mentioned here.

Even after the land reform, their land was in general small owing to the fact that the area was limited, the land was distributed evenly among the peasants in accordance with the number of work hands and family members.

In July 1953 the size of plots of land owned by each peasant household was as follows: no more than one jungbo 32.9 per cent of the total peasant households; 1-2 jungbo 41.7 per cent; 2-3 jungbo 19.1 per cent; more than 3 jungbo 6.3 per cent; the average size of land cultivated by each household throughout the country was no more than 1.8 jungbo.

It must be noted that there was very little difference in the sizes of plots owned by peasants. Each peasant family owned on the average one jungbo in the paddy-field area; in the intermountain area, 1.5 jungbo; in the mountain areas, 2-3 jungbo.

The fragmental land owned by no small number of peasants made it impossible to raise their living standard.

The weak side of individual farming was more vividly revealed during and after the war.

It was quite natural that many peasants actively joined co-ops in order to extricate themselves from the position of small individual peasant economy.

Equality in landownership which minimized the significance of distribution for the contributed land in the co-ops and the revolutionary spirit of the peasants provided important material conditions for organizing the overwhelming majority of the third form of co-ops in the early days.

Together with the above-mentioned internal factors it should be also pointed out that the enormous economic and

technical assistance of peoples of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, and the introduction of their rich and precious experience into our agricultural co-operativization provided favourable conditions for the development of our co-operative movement.

When they started the socialist co-operativization the leading workers in the countryside and the peasants could under the guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea unhesitatingly take the only just direction—the direction taken by the peoples of the fraternal countries.

Correctly calculating on the conditions and factors for co-operativization which became gradually matured already in the period of peaceful construction after liberation and during the Fatherland Liberation War, our Party creatively applied Marxist-Leninist theory on the socialist transformation of agriculture in accordance with the objective requirement of social economic development, and introduced rich experiences of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries in conformity with actual conditions of our country. Thus, the correct line was defined and timely measures were taken to give every possible guidance and assistance to agricultural co-operativization. Therefore, the co-ops in our country were able to develop at an unprecedentedly rapid pace and to achieve great successes.

When the agricultural co-operativization in Korea forged ahead at a rapid pace and the third form of co-ops occupied the overwhelming majority, some one hesitated complaining that "the speed of co-operativization was too rapid and co-operativization trespassed the interests of the middle peasants."

But the rapid tempo of co-operativization and the overwhelming majority of the advanced form of co-ops were completely logical. There is no doubt that unless our Party had surmounted on time conservatism and passivity on the basis of the correct appraisal of actual conditions of the countryside, the task of agricultural co-operativization would not have been successfully, like today, completed in 4 or 5 years after the war. It was shown in the

process of co-operativization of five years that even under the condition in which only handicraft technique without any modern machines and technique is dominant, agricultural co-operativization can be realized and even agricultural co-ops so organized can achieve a decisive superiority over private peasant economy.

It was shown that the landownership and the class-composition in the rural villages and the revolutionary spirit of the peasants constituted important factors for the speedy development of the agricultural co-operative movement. And only with the high degree of enthusiasm of the peasants to carry out the Party's correct policy, and the Party's and government's correct leadership and help, agricultural co-ops could be fully consolidated, even though they rapidly grew in quantity.

True, the victory of agricultural co-operative movement in our country proved vividly the great vitality of the general principle of Marxism-Leninism on the socialist revolution in the countryside and the correctness of agricultural policy of the Party which employed creatively this principle to our historic conditions.



III. SHARP GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL PRO- DUCTIVE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OP SYSTEM

In the post-war period, our Party directed its great force to the successfully carrying out of the agricultural co-operativization and, at the same time, to rapid rebuilding of the war-devastated material and technical foundation of agricultural production.

On the basis of the priority development of heavy industry and the advantages of the new relations of production established in the countryside, the Party and Government waged the whole-Party and nation-wide struggle for sharply stepping up agricultural productive forces.

Having successfully fulfilled the post-war Three-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy (1954-56), our industry witnessed a bigger upsurge from 1957, the first year of the First Five-Year Plan.

In 1958, the total industrial output value was 4 times that in the pre-war year of 1949, or 4.3 times that in the pre-liberation year of 1944.

In the five years of the post-war period, the total industrial output value grew at an average annual rate of 42 per cent, the means of production increased on the average by 52 per cent annually and consumer goods by 34 per cent. Consequently, an end was put to the severe colonial onesidedness in industry, and the self-supporting foundation of the national economy was firmly established.

Rapid development of industry served as the most important guarantee for swiftly rehabilitating and strengthening the material and technical foundation of agriculture

and bringing about a great upsurge in agricultural production.

During the post-war Three-Year Plan period, our agricultural production topped the pre-war level thanks to the struggle for carrying out the decisions of the November 1954 and December 1955 plenums of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. And it continued to develop rapidly on an extensive scale, bringing about an unprecedentedly upsurge.

In rehabilitating and strengthening the foundation of agricultural production, the Party attached prime importance to the construction of river dikes and irrigation systems which were essential for restoring from the damage caused by natural calamities and for increasing per-unit-area harvest.

57 per cent of the total sum of state investment in agriculture in the five years of the post-war period was spent for building river dikes and irrigation systems.

Along with the building of the large-scale projects with state investment, construction of medium- and small-scale river dikes and irrigation systems was widely undertaken by agricultural co-operatives.

During the five years of the post-war period, 629 reservoirs and 1,659 pumping stations were reconstructed or newly built throughout the country. As a result, the paddy fields under irrigation increased from 227,000 jungbo in 1953 to 463,000 jungbo.

Especially, the Pyongnam Irrigation System built during this period alone supplies water to more than 40,000 jungbo of paddy fields.

The proportion of irrigated paddy fields to the total paddies rose from 52 per cent to 91 per cent during this period.

During the five years of the post-war period, construction of river dikes and breakwaters, anti-erosion projects and afforestation work were also undertaken extensively to protect over 350,000 jungbo of farmland from the damage by flood and tidal water.

The number of machine-hire stations increased from

15 to 50, and the number of tractors (in terms of 15 h. p.) increased fourfold.

The Kiyang Farm Machine Factory and many other farm machine factories were reconstructed or newly built, and various kinds of efficient farm machines and implements such as seeders, thrashers and fodder cutters were supplied in large numbers to the rural villages.

The Heungnam Fertilizer Factory and other chemical fertilizer factories were reconstructed in a short space of time from severe war-ruins and were expanded. The supply of chemical fertilizers during the five years since the war increased 12 times.

Agricultural institutes, higher and secondary agricultural schools and courses for training agricultural experts were built and expanded on a large scale to meet the growing demands for agro-technicians, while correspondence courses were opened in higher educational institutes and technical schools.

Under the co-operative economy, it was possible to introduce extensively advanced method of intensive farming and improve the distribution of crops on the principle of right crop on right soil.

In 1957-58, cold bed seedlings, which signify a technical innovation in the battle for good rice harvest, were planted on 50 per cent of the total paddy fields. Introduction of cold bed seedlings helped increase per-jungbo yield of rice by 1-1.5 tons compared with ordinary seedlings. Humus pot planting of cotton, an advanced method which more than doubles the per-jungbo yield, was applied to 70 per cent of the total area under cotton. The area sown to maize, a high-yielding crop, extended from 236,000 jungbo in 1954 to 826,000 jungbo in 1958, while utility rate of land rose from 125 per cent to 161 per cent.

Owing to these measures and the selfless endeavour of the peasants, total grain output kept on increasing—2,870,000 tons in 1956; 3,200,000 tons in 1957; and a record harvest of 3,700,000 tons in 1958. Grain harvest in 1958 was nearly double that in 1946, shortly after the liberation.

With the sharp increase of grain output, the food problem, one of the acute problems in the post-war period, was solved in the main in 1957. We used to import annually hundreds of thousands of tons of grain. But today we have a surplus rice.

This is the most brilliant achievement of our socialist agriculture.

The sharp increase of grain output in our country has resulted primarily from the rise of per-jungbo yield of farm produce.

Extensive introduction of cold bed seedlings, expansion of the irrigated paddy fields, and generous manuring are the essential conditions for the increase of per-jungbo yield of grain. In 1956, the average per-jungbo yield of rice was 24.4 per cent higher than in 1954, and in 1958 it was 32 per cent higher than in 1954. Per-jungbo yield of maize increased by 30 per cent during the same period.

Many advanced agricultural co-operatives have gathered a good harvest inconceivable in the past.

Here are a few instances.

Dooam Agricultural Co-op, Kangnam County of South Pyongan Province, gathered on the average 13 tons of rice per jungbo from 160 jungbo of paddy field in 1958, and the harvest from 1.5 jungbo of an experimental plot reached 55 tons.

Samryong Agricultural Co-op, Soonchun County of South Pyongan Province, harvested an average of 3.6 tons of maize per jungbo from 422 jungbo of field, and from 12 jungbo of field they reaped 18 tons per jungbo.

Wonsa Agricultural Co-op, Ongjin County of South Hwanghai Province, raised per-jungbo yield of wheat to 4.5 tons.

Big achievements have also been registered in other branches. The Government has taken a number of measures for markedly increasing the output of industrial crops. It has raised state purchasing prices of industrial crops, preferentially supplied chemical fertilizers and exempted the cotton growers from tax-in-kind.

In 1958 per-jungbo yield of cotton doubled that in 1953, and its total output increased threefold.

Livestock farming, which suffered most during the war-time, started making a good headway.

By September 1, 1958, the number of cattle in the country had increased 1.3 times that at the end of 1953, and that of hogs 2.8 times. Meat output grew 3.2 times during the five years of the post-war period.

Enormous achievements were also scored in fruit growing and sericulture.

A nation-wide movement is under way for extending the orchard area by 100,000 jungbo during the First Five-Year Plan period.

More than 50,000 jungbo have been reclaimed for fruit growing. Total output of fruits in 1958 was 131,000 tons, or 1.8 times as much as the peak harvest in the pre-war days.

In 1958, we produced 8,700 tons of cocoons, or 1.6 times as much as the peak output in the pre-war days.

In this way, in the recent years extensive upsurge and innovation have been registered in grain production and in all other branches in the countryside where socialism has triumphed.

It must also be noted that, along with the high rate development of agricultural production, the structure of agriculture is undergoing change to meet the demands of the national economy.

Increase of Output of Major Farm Produce

1953 = 100

	1956	1957	1958
Grain	124	138	159
Cotton	28	33	282
Tobacco	600	650	930
Meat	114	193	382
Cocoons	128	178	268
Fruits	118	287	336

Composition of Total Value of Agricultural Output

	1953	1956	1957	1958
Crop cultivation	89.1	86.8	83.9	72.8

Stock breeding	9.7	11.7	14.4	23.4
Sericulture	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.9
Others	0.3	0.4	0.4	1.9
Total	100	100	100	100

From the above tables we can see that our agriculture has taken the course of many-sided development, with stress on grain. Agricultural production has been stepped up to supply raw materials to industry and to meet the growing demands of the population for meat and fruits.

Rapid growth of agricultural production has led to the strengthening of economic foundation of agricultural co-operatives and swift improvement of the living of co-op members.

Until 1956 agricultural co-ops set aside on the average about 5 per cent of their incomes for common reserves. But, as the living of the co-op members improved steadily, the rate of common reserve funds increased to about 10 per cent in 1957 and more than 15 per cent in 1958.

The total sum of commonly-owned property of our agricultural co-operatives last year was about 686 million won, or on the average 51,500 won for each agricultural co-operative, or on the average 650 won for each co-op household. Compared with 1955, the sum of commonly-owned property for each household increased 2.4 times on the average.

This serves to show that our agricultural co-operatives have laid the foundation necessary for steadily extending reproduction and capital construction.

Our agricultural co-operatives have set aside an increasingly greater amount from their incomes and harvest for common reserve funds, seed, fodder, and grain to be exchanged with fertilizers. Nevertheless, the share of co-op members has increased systematically.

Increase of the Share Per Co-op Household

	1955 = 100		
	1956	1957	1958
Grain	129	139	146
Potatoes	185	225	260
Cash	170	244	364

Shortly after the armistice, poor peasants accounted for about 40 per cent of the total peasant households. But in 4-5 years since then their living standards have been improved to those of middle peasants or above.

As the economic foundation of agricultural co-operatives has been consolidated and the living of co-op members has improved, construction of modern villages is undertaken extensively. Our rural villages are changing their looks with every passing day.

Many buildings for common economy such as stalls, silk-worm breeding rooms and stores, as well as large numbers of educational, cultural, public health and public welfare establishments have been built in our countryside. By the end of 1958, schools with over 8,000 class-rooms, 6,400 nurseries and kindergartens, 9,000 democratic publicity halls and clubs and many clinics, bath houses, barber shops and laundries were built in the rural areas.

Tens of thousands of modern dwelling houses have been built in the countryside. By the end of 1958, electricity had found its way to 67 per cent of the rural villages, and 49 per cent of the peasant households had electric light.

Many agricultural co-operatives have installed telephone service and through-wire radio system.

With the enforcement of universal compulsory primary and middle school education and with the extensive adult education, cultural standard of peasants has rapidly improved and new socialist national culture is flowering in our countryside.

Over 50,000 cultural, art and physical culture circles involving more than one million peasants are now functioning in our rural areas. Ideological consciousness of peasants is being remoulded.

The entire agricultural co-op members, who have scored great victory following the path shown by the Party, are firmly determined to further strengthen and develop the co-operative economy and defend to the last the gains of socialism.

The outdated ideological remnants of a small property owner are gradually being eliminated from co-op mem-

bers; and with the enhancement of the ideological consciousness of collectivism, unity and solidarity between co-op members have been further strengthened and our co-op members are taking an active part in joint labour and are displaying to the full their creative enthusiasm in socialist construction.

All this serves to show that agricultural co-operativization has brought about a radical change not only in the relations of production, but also in the cultural and intellectual life of the people.

The basic line of economic construction of our Party in the post-war period and the Party's agricultural policy are most correct and, to carry out this policy, the entire peasants under the leadership of the working class have displayed a high degree of patriotic enthusiasm and rendered distinguished labour service. Consequently they could register such big achievements in agriculture.

To strengthen steadily the positive reaction of the relations of production upon the development of the productive forces—this assumes great importance in the economic policy of the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

In this connection Comrade Kim Il Sung said:

“The socialist co-operative economy system, too, cannot pause at one place. It must develop and must be further strengthened.”

Since the first day of the agricultural co-operative movement, our Party has corrected in good time factors impeding the development of production in the inner life of agricultural co-operatives, and improved and strengthened the system and order in agricultural co-operatives to meet the demands of the steady development of productive forces.

What assumed momentous significance in this connection was the amalgamation of agricultural co-operatives which was carried out throughout the country between October and November last year.

As has already been noted, in guiding the agricultural co-operative movement our Party has given particularly prudent attention to the size of agricultural co-operatives.

When their size is too small, agricultural co-operatives will not display to the full the advantages of the co-operative economy, and, on the contrary, when their size is too big, agricultural co-operatives will encounter great difficulties in the management of common economy.

Here is a table illustrating the growth of the average size of agricultural co-operatives in our country.

	Average number of peasant households embraced in a co-op	Average acreage of arable land culti- vated by a co-op (jungbo)
At the end of 1953	15	14
At the end of 1954	33	57
At the end of 1955	42	73
At the end of 1956	55	88
At the end of 1957	64	105
March 1958		
(before amalgamation)	79	133
November 1958		
(after amalgamation)	275	406

The average size of agricultural co-operatives has grown considerably in 4-5 years, both in the number of member households and in the acreage of arable land.

The growth of size of agricultural co-operatives represents the rehabilitation and strengthening of material and technical foundation of agriculture in the post-war period—expansion of the network of machine-hire stations and construction of many irrigation systems—and the marked enhancement of political and business standards of the co-op management personnel and the leading personnel in the field of agriculture. At the same time, this corresponded to the rapid development of agricultural co-operative movement.

In the course of mass development of the agricultural co-operative movement, many peasants joined the already formed co-ops, while the new co-ops were formed on a bigger scale than the co-ops formed at the early stage of

the agricultural co-operative movement. Consequently, the composition of co-ops in size changed remarkably.

Composition of Co-ops in Size

	At the end of 1954	At the end of 1955	At the end of 1956	At the end of 1957	In March 1958
Less than 30 households	57.0	38.9	23.0	15.3	8.5
31-50 households	27.7	34.6	33.0	28.6	20.4
51-100 households	13.1	23.4	35.4	42.2	44.5
101-200 households	2.2	2.9	7.9	12.9	24.1
201-300 households	—	0.2	0.7	0.8	2.1
Above 301 households	—	—	—	0.2	0.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

By June 1955, co-ops with less than 30 member households had accounted for the greater part, while in June 1956 co-ops with member households of 31-50 made up the greater part, and since March 1957 co-ops with member households of 51-100 had occupied a greater proportion.

At the Conference of Agricultural Co-op Management Personnel of South Pyongan Province in January 1957, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that a co-op with 40-100 member households was in general a proper size under the conditions prevailing in our country.

A co-op of this size was appropriate at that time, for it could effectively cultivate its farmland mainly with handicraft technique, and the co-op could undertake jointly certain side-lines.

At the experimental stage, the size of agricultural co-operatives in all districts of the country was almost

the same—around 10-20 member households. But a marked difference was brought about after the co-operative movement started mass development. Generally speaking, co-ops in the plain area assumed a bigger size than the co-ops in the mountain area.

This can be explained by the average size of co-ops in different provinces.

**Average Number of Member Households and Average
Acreage of Land of a Co-op**

(in August 1958)

	Average number of member households	Average acreage of land
Pyongyang City	71	84
South Pyongan Province	98	174
North Pyongan Province	90	140
Jagang Province	64	140
South Hwanghai Province	87	135
North Hwanghai Province	73	133
South Hamkyung Province	74	102
North Hamkyung Province	72	148
Kangwon Province	73	123
Ryanggang Province	50	152
Kaesong City	83	95
Average	80	137

In North and South Pyongan Provinces which have large tracts of plain area, the average number of member households of a co-op is bigger than in the mountainous provinces of Jagang and Ryanggang. It is, therefore, self-evident that the natural-geographical conditions in mountainous districts where peasants lived far apart from each other and farmland was scattered, constituted the primary conditions retarding the speed of the development of the co-operative movement as well as the growth of the size of co-ops.

The comparatively small size proved to be no longer suited to the rapid progress of agricultural productive forces and to the further development of co-ops. It now became an obstacle to the rational utilization of land, improvement of labour organization, many-sided develop-

ment of the common economy and especially to the mechanization of farming. Under the condition of small scale co-ops, considerable waste and irrationality were found in the extensive rural construction.

Therefore, there arose before our Party the pressing task of opening up brighter prospects for the development of agriculture by eliminating the discrepancy between the comparatively small-scale agricultural co-operatives and the productive forces and by successfully carrying out the immediate tasks of technical and cultural revolutions in the countryside.

This was a fully matured task, because the organizational and economic foundation of agricultural co-ops had been strengthened and the political and business standards of co-op management personnel had been raised considerably over the past five years, and because mass production of modern equipment and farm machines such as tractors and lorries started at home.

The amalgamation of agricultural co-operatives was a complicated task. Nevertheless, it was accomplished smoothly in 1-2 months with the unanimous support of the peasants.

As a result, more than 13,000 agricultural co-ops were merged into about 3,800, with the average number of member households of a co-op increasing from 80 to about 300 and the acreage of the arable land cultivated by a co-op was extended from 130 jungbo to 500 jungbo.

Consequently, agricultural co-operatives were provided with the conditions for undertaking land construction on a full scale, more widely introducing modern farm machines and advanced farming methods, developing the common economy in a diversified way by making effective use of natural economic conditions, checking waste of labour power and materials in rural construction, and for pushing ahead with the rural construction in a planned way.

How then did the amalgamation of agricultural co-ops proceed?

Agricultural co-operatives were merged into one in each *ri* (the lowest administrative unit), and the chairman

of the *ri* people's committee is appointed concurrently the managerial chairman of the co-op.

This was the measure for bringing *ri* people's committees closer to production and raising their function and leadership over the economic and cultural construction in *ri*.

Engels said that under socialism and Communism "the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production."

Naturally, under present conditions in our country "government of persons" is one of the important functions of the *ri* people's committees. But it must also be noted that the function of "administering things and conducting processes of production" is being increasingly extended.

Our Party took into account such actual conditions in merging agricultural co-operatives into one in each *ri* and appointing the chairman of *ri* people's committee concurrently the managerial chairman of a co-op.

In amalgamating agricultural co-operatives, our Party transferred the management of rural consumers' co-operative stores and credit co-operatives which had exercised their function independently in each *ri* to the agricultural co-operatives.

This enables the agricultural co-operatives to organize and manage under a unified plan all economic affairs from production to distribution, exchange and consumption, thereby accelerating the process of reproduction and further improving the wellbeing of co-op members.

This is to meet the objective requirements for enhancing the material interest of peasants and harvesting farm produce in greater abundance by further promoting marketing of commodities and money circulation in the countryside.

Next, with the amalgamation, the range of activities of agricultural co-operatives grew. Besides economic management, they now undertake educational, cultural, public health and public welfare work.

This means that our agricultural co-operatives no longer confine themselves merely to economic matters, but pay attention to the whole aspects of peasants' life and assume responsibility for their life.

The extension of the range of activity of co-ops was to meet the earnest desire of our peasants, who, subjected to onerous oppression and exploitation for centuries, had been most backward, to raise rapidly their cultural standard.

In this way, the Government, while conducting unified guidance over education, entrusts agricultural co-ops with the management of schools.

This makes it possible to expand speedily the network of schools of all levels, with little state expenditure and, at the same time, this is of great significance for integrating production with education.

In his report to the Twenty-first Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade N. S. Khrushchov particularly stressed the necessity of gradually transferring functions of government organs to social organizations. And this is now being practised in the Soviet Union.

It is to meet the demands arising in the development of socialist society towards Communism that in our country the state has transferred much of its work to agricultural co-operatives.

Organization of educational, cultural, public health and public welfare work by agricultural co-operatives is of particular significance for the growth of communist elements in the countryside.

When educational, cultural, public health and public welfare establishments are provided to co-op members free of charge for, as Marx noted, "the common satisfaction of needs," they are all embryos of Communism.

Management of educational, cultural, public health and public welfare work by agricultural co-ops is of great significance in preparing for the building of Communism.

The National Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives held in January 1959, summed up the great victory in the socialist agricultural co-operativization in our country,

set forth the tasks for further development of agriculture and, at the same time, adopted new Standard Rules of agricultural co-operatives.

With a view to hastening the completion of socialist construction in the countryside and gradually preparing for the building of Communist society, the new Standard Rules provide for the further extending and strengthening of the socialist co-operative ownership of the means of production and the turning of them into ownership by the whole people.

Agricultural co-operativization was completed and the third form, fully socialist, became the sole form of agricultural co-operatives and share is distributed according to the work done. On this basis, the Standard Rules proclaimed land and all other means of production as the socialist co-operative ownership.

The Standard Rules put an end to the private ownership of land which had existed for several thousand years and which was legally permitted even in the co-op of the third form. All land owned by co-op members are brought under common ownership according to the new Standard Rules, and this is an epoch-making event in the historical development in our country.

In the early days of the agricultural co-operative movement, co-op members were allowed to some extent to own privately draft animals and farm implements, when they so desired, and in such case these were used jointly by co-op members. But according to the new Standard Rules draft animals and farm implements are placed under common ownership, and the scale of side-line privately run by co-op members and the acreage of kitchen garden for co-op members were reduced markedly.

The aim of developing the co-operative ownership into public ownership and the line of applying socialist principle in production and distribution of share and promoting Communist co-operation are laid down in the Standard Rules.

The agricultural co-operative movement in our country has gone through the experimental stage, mass development stage and the stage of completion in its progress.

These stages were determined by the different speed and form of the movement. Therefore, they do not represent any changes of co-ops in their quality and character.

Viewed from the point of social and economic development, the five years of the progress of our agricultural co-operative movement from the experimental stage to the stage of completion was a historic period when the private ownership of the means of production was converted into co-operative ownership and exclusive dominance of the socialist agriculture was established in the countryside.

The past five years was a period of sweeping revolutionary transformation of production relations, a period, as Comrade Kim Il Sung noted, marked by the rapid development of productive forces, further consolidation of the co-operative economy, swift improvement of peasants' life and the high spirit of our peasants. During this period, the foundation was laid for developing our agriculture to a higher stage.

The position of our agricultural co-operatives has been radically changed. Our agricultural co-operatives are now in a position to introduce gradually up-to-date machines and technique into their common economy. Moreover, the agricultural co-operatives are not related with the private capitalist elements and small commodity products, as the agricultural co-operativization and socialist transformation of private commerce and industry were completed simultaneously.

In production and supply of commodities, our agricultural co-ops deal only with state-operated bodies and enterprises and are related with other co-operative economy.

The character of our agricultural co-operative economy has undergone changes and developed in many spheres. Our co-ops today are different from and far more advanced than the co-ops of the third form.

This progress was not made in a day.

Our agricultural co-ops underwent constant quantitative and qualitative changes in the course of its development. The progress of our agricultural co-ops has been made possible not only by the changes and development

within agriculture itself but also by the all-round changes and development of our society and economy.

With the changes in the scale and character of agricultural co-operatives—this represents a stage of fresh progress of the agricultural co-operative economy—brighter prospects are opened up for the development of agricultural productive forces in our country.



IV. FOR FURTHER UPSURGE IN AGRICULTURE

A high tide of socialist construction is sweeping our country, and the entire working people are pressing ahead on a winged horse, in response to Party's call.

The First Five-Year Plan (1957-61) under which the total value of industrial output is to increase 2.6 times, is expected to be fulfilled within 1959, more than two years ahead of schedule.

During the first two years of the current First Five-Year Plan, that is, in 1957 and 1958, our industrial output doubled.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 1958, our Party, on the basis of the achievements in socialist construction and the high revolutionary zeal of the working people, advanced prospective tasks of turning our country into an advanced socialist industrial country.

The prospective tasks envisage a big leap forward in the production of major industrial products in the next six or seven years: output of electric power is to increase 2.6 times; coal, 3.6 times; pig iron and granulated iron, 9 times; steel, 8-9 times; cement, 4 times; chemical fertilizers, 3.3-4.3 times; and fabrics, 4.6 times.

When these tasks are carried out, the per capita output of electric power will reach 2,000 kwh, coal 2,500 kg, pig iron and granulated iron 400 kg., steel 300-350 kg., cement 500 kg., chemical fertilizers 150-200 kg., and fabrics more than 50 metres.

Determined to carry out the huge tasks presented by the Party earlier than scheduled, our working people are

displaying inexhaustible creative energy in their strenuous endeavour.

In order to hasten the completion of socialist construction and preparations for gradually going over to Communism, our agriculture must keep pace with the rapidly developing industry.

The primary tasks now confronting our agriculture are to accomplish the technical and cultural revolutions in the near future and thereby further strengthen and develop politically and economically the socialist co-operative economy and turn our rural villages into rich, modern, socialist villages where modern technique is employed in the farming.

Material and technical foundation of our agriculture has been strengthened considerably, but the technical reform was lagging behind the economic transformation.

Until now our agricultural co-operatives have displayed their superiority primarily on the basis of handicraft technique. But today our agricultural co-ops find it impossible to ensure a bigger upsurge in production, unless they are furnished with modern technique.

It is clear that our advanced socialist co-operative economy can no longer base itself on backward handicraft technique. Therefore, the technical revolution, with the building of irrigation systems, mechanization and electrification as its main contents, is presented as the most urgent and central task of our agriculture.

The completion of agricultural co-operativization, extension of the scale of the co-operatives, consolidation of their economic foundation and the building up of the bases of heavy industry—all this presents the technical revolution in the countryside as matured task. Consequently, our Party set the following targets: putting the entire arable land under irrigation within 2-3 years, mechanization of agriculture within 4-5 years, electrification within 1-2 years. And the state took steps for mobilizing agricultural co-operatives for successfully implementing these tasks.

While the construction of big-scale irrigation projects and work on the hydro-power stations were undertaken with state funds, the Party has encouraged the agricultural co-operatives to build medium- and small-scale irrigation projects and power stations. Then the Party saw to it that the co-ops with sufficient economic foundation should secure modern machinery and equipment including tractors and lorries.

Such measures are the manifestation of the Leninist principle on the full display of the creativeness and activeness of popular masses in socialist construction.

Irrigation is the keynote of the technical revolution in our agriculture. Irrigation is of decisive significance in increasing agricultural products under the condition in which rice cultivation on paddy-fields holds a most important place and a long drought and frequent floods occur in spring and summer.

Indeed, Lenin's words that "irrigation is needed, above all, as it transforms or revives the border region, buries the past, and accelerating the transition to socialism" fully meets with the reality of our country. (Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. 32, Russian ed. p. 297.)

Now that the irrigation of paddy fields has been, in the main, completed thanks to the consistent measures taken by the Party for the expansion of the acreage under irrigation, the cardinal task of irrigation lies in rapidly establishing the non-paddy irrigation system.

Only by doing so can we swiftly increase grain harvest on the non-paddy fields which occupy over two thirds of the arable land and at the same time develop simultaneously and on a full scale the branches of industrial crops, stock-breeding, pomiculture and sericulture.

The September (1958) Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party set forth the task of completing the irrigation system on all arable land with the exception of steep slopes within the next 2 or 3 years.

Already over 10,000 projects, including the state

sponsored big-scale irrigation project in Kiyang (the acreage under irrigation will cover 51,000 jungbo), Ujidon (34,000 jungbo) and in the Yalu River basin (95,000 jungbo), are under way. During the past 6 months from the September (1958) Plenum to the spring of this year, reservoirs, pumping stations and other irrigation facilities for irrigating 377,000 jungbo were built. As a result, by the end of June 1959 the total acreage of irrigated land in our country had reached over 800,000 jungbo. Thus, the national task of irrigation in the countryside has been fulfilled in the main.

Remarkable success has also been attained in the field of mechanization of farm work.

The many-sided development of agriculture, wide application of the advanced intensive farming methods, undertaking of big-scale irrigation projects and other rural construction and the sharp increase in the volume of transport that followed co-operativization—all this brought about an acute shortage of labour, farm machines and transport facilities in the countryside.

Without mechanization of major farming and transport work the continuous growth of agricultural production and vast scale construction could not be successfully ensured.

The acreage of farm land (excluding slopes with a 12 degree gradient, swamps and stony fields), on which mechanization can be introduced, amounts to some 1,400,000 jungbo.

At least 30,000-35,000 tractors and 25,000-30,000 lorries are needed for the overall mechanization of basic farming work and heavy transport work in the rural areas.

This year 5,000 tractors and 2,500 lorries will be sent to the countryside, most of which will be Korean-make. And within the coming 4-5 years the need for tractors and lorries will be fully met.

A number of agricultural co-ops have already purchased tractors and lorries and the network of farm machine hire stations continues to expand. The number of farm machine hire stations increased from 59 to 80.

So far, the agricultural co-ops used modern farm machines of the state farm machine hire station. But in future the co-operatives will possess modern farm machines for themselves.

Many ex-servicemen and the junior and senior middle school graduates who had worked in the co-ops have been dispatched to farm machine hire stations and state farms to be trained as tractor drivers and mechanics. In this way, the mechanized work teams have been organized in the co-ops, and a full scale readjusting of fields is now in progress.

It is expected in the coming 2 or 3 years labour power needed in the rural areas will increase at least 2-fold.

Hence, it is the urgent problem to raise rapidly labour productivity by widely introducing medium- and small-scale mechanization in combination with large-scale mechanization.

In our agriculture, paddy-field farming holds an important place. The land is undulated and slopes are very steep. Intensive cultivation such as mixed-crop and furrow cultivations has been in long practice. The differences of natural and economic conditions vary greatly according to the localities. Accordingly, it is of great significance to contrive and popularize various kinds of farm machines, particularly, simple medium and small farm implements suitable to the actual condition.

For the completion of irrigation and mechanization in the countryside, electrification should be pushed ahead of them.

According to the preliminary investigation, for electrification of the countryside 920 million kwh of electricity will be needed, 5 times more than the power the countryside consumes at present. It is estimated that big power stations will supply 580 million kwh while the remaining 340 million kwh will be produced at 8,600 medium and small power stations of agricultural co-ops. These co-op power stations will have a capacity of 20 kw on an average.

At present, the construction of medium- and small-scale power stations in every rural village along with such

big-scale hydropower stations as Dokrogang, Kangge and Woonbong, is being pushed ahead briskly.

Our country is abundantly endowed with water power and other electric resources. And the construction of large-scale water conservancy projects have been carried out. Thus favourable conditions are provided for power generation.

Already more than 800 power stations had been built during the four months from September 1958 when the construction of medium- and small-scale power stations started in the countryside.

It is planned that this year the rural villages will be supplied with equipment and machinery to build some 6,000 medium- and small-scale power stations. Then the electrification of the countryside will be completed in the main by 1960.

Proceeding from the fact that the foundation of co-operatives has been consolidated and the living standard of the co-operative members as a whole improved, the new Standard Rules of the co-operatives provide for raising the common reserve funds from 10-15 per cent to 15-30 per cent or more for the successful implementation of technical revolution.

In the meantime, the Party and Government took steps to help the co-operatives increase their accumulations.

From January 1, 1959, the rate of taxes-in-kind was lowered from 20.1 per cent to 8.4 per cent on an average, and its amount is fixed. And it will eventually be abolished in the future.

It has been the consistent line of our Party to develop a diversified agriculture with the stress on the grain production, widely introducing the advanced intensive farming methods and actively pushing forward irrigation projects, mechanization and electrification in the countryside.

Our Party put forward the militant tasks of increasing the output of farm produce in the near future: grain to 7 million tons, cotton to 200,000 tons, meat to 400,000 tons, cocoons to 60,000-70,000 tons, fruit to over 250,000 tons. These figures show an increase of some 2 times in grain, 4 times in cotton, 4.4 times in meat, 8 times in cocoons and

2 times in fruit compared with 1958. In this way, our rural villages will provide a rich food base and a raw material base.

Only with such rapid development of agricultural production in a diversified way, it was possible to eradicate completely the backwardness and onesidedness seen in our agricultural production, to bring about balanced development of industry and agriculture, to meet the varying requirements of the population, and to raise the income of cooperative members. In the past, our agriculture concentrated exclusively on raising the grain crops and failed to solve even this.

Now that the grain problem has been solved and the technical transformation of agriculture is being carried out on full scale, favourable conditions for developing the cooperative economy in a diversified way have been created.

Our Party has set the tasks of raising paddy rice output per jungbo to 10-15 tons, maize to 4-5 tons, wheat to 3-4 tons, and cotton to 3-4 tons within the coming 2 or 3 years.

To this end, wide application of the advanced intensive farming methods—irrigation, deep ploughing, close planting, liberal fertilizing and sowing of best-quality seeds—is most important.

In the light of the fact that the acreage of arable land in our country is limited, such intensive farming methods are of decisive significance.

If we plough more than 30 cm deep (10 cm in the past), apply an average of 500 kg of chemical fertilizers per jungbo (200 kg in the past) and 50 tons of compost (10 tons in the past) within the next 2 or 3 years and further raise planting density of all crops, harvest can be immensely increased.

The cold-bed rice seedling method which is a great technical innovation in the cultivation of paddy rice should be developed further. If 300 seedlings are planted to one pyong, each seedling will sprout 6 branches and each ear will bear 80 grains of rice on an average. Taking the weight of 1,000 grains as 25 grams, the per pyong yield will reach 3.6 kg or 10.8 tons per jungbo. A harvest of

more than 5 million tons of rice can be expected from only 500,000 jungbo. Then people will be supplied more than enough with rice and flour as their principal food.

In 1958 there were some co-ops, that harvested 55 tons of rice per jungbo, 18 tons of maize, 4.5 tons of wheat, 6.7 tons of cotton. And it can be safely said that these high yields can be surpassed.

To cite one example:

The Dooam Agricultural Co-operative, Kangnam County, South Pyongan Province, gathered 55 tons of paddy rice per jungbo on a 1.5 jungbo experimental plot. To do this they ploughed the field only 20 cm deep, applied 75 tons of compost per jungbo and transplanted 133 cold-bed seedlings per pyong. But suppose they plough 30 cm deep, apply 100-200 tons of compost and transplant over 250 cold-bed seedlings, there is no doubt that the per jungbo yield of rice will go yet higher.

The same thing is true with maize, wheat, cotton and other crops.

In the field of stock-breeding, too, our Party set the tasks of increasing the number of domestic animals: cows from 660,000 to one million, pigs from 1.4 million to four million, sheep and goats from 150,000 to 600,000-700,000. These figures will be attained within the next two or three years, while raising the annual output of meat to 400,000 tons, milk to 460,000 tons and eggs to 1.5 billion. Thus, per capita production of meat will be 40 kg, milk 46 kg and eggs 150.

For the rapid development of stock-breeding, the most lagging field in our agriculture, main efforts have been concentrated on the joint stock-breeding by the co-operatives and on establishing firm fodder bases. For this purpose two-crop cultivation will be extensively introduced and fodder fields will be expanded to 500,000-600,000 jungbo in 3-4 years.

A number of measures have been taken to bring about a new change in sericulture, pomiculture and apiculture and in fresh-water fish breeding.

While emphasizing the development of agricultural

production, our Party is actively promoting rural construction, above all, productive construction.

Office buildings, building material production establishments, metal-working shops, wood-working shops, warehouses, facilities for processing agricultural products will be built in the countryside. Furthermore, it is expected that within the next 4 or 5 years 800,000 dwelling houses, school buildings with over 2,800 class rooms besides kindergartens, creches, clubs, hospitals, restaurants, stores, bath houses and cultural establishments will be built or improved.

It is also expected that by 1963 the amount of common reserve funds of all agricultural co-operatives throughout the country will stand approximately at 4.4 billion won. Only some 700 million won, that is, 16 per cent of the total amount of common reserve funds, will be needed to build all these schools, dwelling houses and cultural facilities. This bespeaks that our agricultural co-operatives can carry out the cultural construction programme in parallel with the productive construction.

In the meantime, by 1961 per household share will reach over 2 tons of grain and over 1,000 won in cash on an average. This will enable all the co-operative members to purchase a modern dwelling house on easy terms.

The basic task of the cultural revolution for raising the level of general knowledge and technology of the entire peasants is also being successfully carried out.

The compulsory three-year middle school education system has been put into effect, starting from November 1958 and the universal compulsory two-year technical education system will be enforced in the very near future.

The preparatory work for enforcing the universal compulsory technical education system ahead of schedule is now going full fledge in every rural village, while teachers for technical schools are being trained in special courses attached to the higher educational institutions and higher technical schools.

At the same time, large numbers of co-operative members are studying in working people's schools and working people's middle schools which were set up to raise the

general educational level of the entire peasants above the level of the elementary school or junior middle school graduates.

All these facts indicate that the tasks of the cultural revolution in our country are being successfully carried out.

* * *

Today the entire peasants of our country have risen up as one for the implementation of the programmatic tasks laid down by Premier Kim Il Sung at the National Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives and the entire working class is giving powerful support to them.

In the course of discussing the Letter of the Party Central Committee sent to the entire Party members in September, last year, and the measures for implementing the tasks set forth at the National Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives, the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative activeness of farmers have been heightened more than ever.

They have set up higher targets for increased production than the state plan and are putting up a strenuous struggle to carry them out.

There is no shadow of doubt that our co-operative members will victoriously carry out, under the correct guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea and with the powerful support of the working class, the magnificent plan for socialist rural construction drawn up by the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea headed by Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The harder our peasants work, the higher the productive forces will rise. The higher the productive forces rise, the sooner we will reach the eminence of socialism.

Looking forward to the bright future leading to Communist society where the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" operates, our peasants are marching vigorously toward Communism.

